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Human Rights in the WTO: Whose
Rights, What Humanity? Comment on Petersmann
  
This is a wide-ranging essay by a scholar who has been a pioneer in
relating the law and philosophy of human rights to the multilateral trading
regime. This is now a fashionable subject, and we do well to remember that, as
it were, Petersmann was there first.
It is impossible to disagree with many of Petersmann's propositions,
stated at the high level of abstraction that characterizes much of this text.
After the failure of communism in the Soviet Bloc, and of neo-Marxist
development models in the third world, there are few who would disagree with
Petersmann that the full realization of human rights is incompatible with
ruthless suppression of market freedoms. Yet a moment's reflection on phenomena
such as conflict diamonds and sex tourism suffices to remind us that the
markets and trade are entwined with some of the most horrific human rights
abuses, and on a massive scale. It is true that democracy and democratization
have been linked to the project of a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (and
rightly so), but it is also true that the neo-liberal economic policy
prescriptions presupposed by some (albeit not all) aspects of that project have
contributed to social and political instability in some Latin American
countries, threatening the gains of democratization. Nor is the European
experience, on which Petersmann relies heavily, as straightforward as he
presents it. Europe began with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
not a free market project, but a dirigiste one, premised on the gains to social
and political stability of industrial planning at the European level; and the
early failure to transform the ECSC into a constitutional European project
resulted in two tracks, a human rights track represented by the European
Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, as well as a
common market track, the latter entailing not only the protection of market
freedoms but also supranational economic regulation, underpinned by
institutions of governance.1
It is true, and indeed worthy of recollection, that free trade and human rights
are both the intellectual progeny of the Enlightenment, represented by
Petersmann through the figure of Immanuel Kant. But Kant, at least, was
open-eyed; he saw the connection of the commercial spirit of his age not only
with democratic republicanism but also with horrific imperialistic
violence.
In sum, the relation of market freedom, or free trade, to human rights
is in almost all situations a complex one, which cannot be well grasped by
thinking in general terms about 'synergies', nor in terms of linear or
teleological progression from economic integration to human rights-based
constitutionalism. In order, therefore, to engage with Petersmann's project for
the 'integration' of human rights and international economic law into a
constitutional order, we have to pass to the specifics, and to be ever mindful
of the context, the times in which we live, and in the name of whom and
what the discourses of human rights, free trade, and constitutionalism
are being invoked. God, or the devil, is in the details.
What, exactly, is Petersmann's vision of free trade constitutionalism
and what is its relationship to the project of international human rights law?
In this essay, Petersmann does not define constitutionalism, or the
'constitutional', very precisely, except to identify it (only in the
conclusion, however) as a mechanism that protects against abuses of power and
to associate its core substantive content with six 'principles'.2 In the body of the essay,
Petersmann deploys the language of constitutionalism in a rather loose manner.
Thus, all of the following are invocations of the 'constitutional' idea of
Petersmann:
- Human rights tend 'to limit the constitutional task of
governments to the "common public interest" defined in terms of equal human
rights' (at 627).
- '... the complementary constitutional principles
needed for effectuating human rights - such as democratic participation,
parliamentary rule-making, transparent "deliberative democracy" and judicial
protection of the rule of law - are not yet part of the law and practice of
most worldwide organizations' (at 627).
- 'The constitutional guarantees of the EU for economic
liberties and the complementary constitutional, competition,
environmental and social safeguards have also induced numerous EU initiatives
to strengthen competition, environmental and social law in worldwide
international agreements. The strong competition law of the EC reflects the
constitutional insight that - in the economy no less than in the polity
- equal freedoms of citizens and open markets need to be legally protected
against abuses of public powers as well as of private powers' (at 632).
- 'In addition, most states recognize human rights in their respective
constitutional laws as constitutional restraints on government
powers85' (at 633).
- '... the ICJ has not yet specified to what extent human rights also
entail constitutional limits on the UN and its specialized agencies' (at
634).
- '... inalienable human rights which today constitutionally
restrain all national and international rule-making powers' (at 635).
- '... the UN Charter presented such hard-fought-for "revolutions" in
international law designed to extend freedom, non-discrimination, the rule of
law and social welfare across frontiers, even though diplomats carefully
avoided the politically charged language of "international
constitutional law" (e.g. in contrast to the "Constitution of the ILO"
of 1919)' (at 636).
- '... the WTO rules - even if formulated in terms of rights and
obligations of governments -serve as "constitutional functions"
for rendering human rights and the corresponding obligations of governments
more effective in the trade policy area' (at 644).
- 'As sectoral competition rules risk being "captured" and abused by
special interest groups, the proposals for limiting cartel agreements and other
anti-competitive business practices and abuses of intellectual property rights
through worldwide WTO minimum standards for undistorted competition and
transnational cooperation among competition authorities are of
constitutional significance for the protection of freedom,
non-discrimination and the mutually beneficial division of labour across
frontiers' (at 647).
- '... international "treaty constitutions" (such as the EC
Treaty and the ILO Constitution) ... (at 648)'.
It is difficult to discern a precise claim about constitutionalization
of international law from all these various usages of the word, in its
adjectival and other variants. In fact, however, Petersmann's earlier work
is fairly precise or specific in what is meant by constitutionalism.
Constitutionalism is identified with legal pre-commitment that ties the hands
of governments, allowing them to resist pressures by rent-seeking groups for
interference with property and other economic rights.3 For Petersmann, domestic constitutional
arrangements are inadequate to achieve this purpose; hence, the rationale for
treaties such as the GATT. Petersmann, a long-serving GATT official, was
probably unique among 'insiders' in grasping, as early as the 1970s, that
purely economic rationales for multilateral trade liberalization were weak or
precarious - after all classical economics suggested that, in most situations,
unilateral trade liberalization increased domestic welfare, thus making
bargained multilateral liberalization a puzzle, considered strictly from the
perspective of the economic theory of trade.4 In addition, while generally speaking those legal
scholars who studied the GATT tended to view it as a set of bargained
concessions, Petersmann was ahead of his time in seeing the importance of the
multilateral trading regime embodying rules, such as non-discrimination
(MFN and National Treatment). While such rules can be understood functionally
in terms of constraining 'cheating' on bargained concessions, they have,
nevertheless, the formal structure of general juridical norms, and therefore
their validation, including through interpretation by judicial or
quasi-judicial tribunals, inevitably raises the question of justice. Even if
economists may explain the rules instrumentally, or in terms that are
indifferent to justice or fairness, their interpretation by an impartial and
disinterested 'third party' (the judge) cannot be purely instrumental.
The judge is inevitably concerned with justice, and seeks an interpretation
that can be seen as fair inter partes.5 This implication of a legal, as opposed to a
diplomatic, approach to dispute settlement was seen more clearly and earlier by
Petersmann than by the other greats of GATT era trade law scholarship, Hudec
and Jackson, who embraced judicialization of dispute settlement, but within an
overall pragmatic or economic functionalist vision of the rules in the
multilateral trading system.
For Petersmann, then, legitimacy of the WTO as a juridical system
depends on the transformation of what he calls 'market freedoms' into
'fundamental rights'. Petersmann is well aware that in the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the right to property and freedom of
contract have not been recognized as human rights, and attributes this fact to
'anti-market bias'. But this is a question-begging manner of making the case
that property and contractual rights should be recognized as fundamental
rights at the international level. In the present essay, Petersmann is not only
for these economic rights, but also for 'social rules' at the global
level6 and other human
rights needed to correct market 'abuses'. But he provides not a shred of
evidence that a more optimal democratic response to the limits of markets will
be facilitated by governments having to justify their social interventions at
the international level as limits on the 'fundamental rights' of property and
contract. According to Petersmann, 'Human rights need to be legally
concretized, mutually balanced and implemented by democratic legislation which
tends to vary from country to country.' At one point in his essay, Petersmann
suggests that the effect of giving property and contractual rights the status
of fundamental rights at the international level would be to constrain that
democratic balancing by imposing a requirement of necessity whenever a
government seeks to limit such rights (at 641). In Petersmann's ideal world, a
citizen could directly challenge social, environmental or other public policies
and the government that had enacted those policies would be required to show
that they are necessary limits on freedom of trade (or property rights). To the
extent that the public policies in question themselves happen to be based on
human rights (for example, social rights), we can see clearly the hierarchy of
rights that Petersmann is proposing. Social and other positive human rights may
only be pursued by governments to the extent to which they can be shown as
'necessary' limits on market freedoms. But why not the reverse? Why not subject
free trade rules to strict scrutiny under a necessity test, where these
rules make it more difficult for governments to engage in interventionist
policies to protect social rights?
Petersmann's implicit answer to this question entails recourse to the
standard faith of the ideological free traders that 'trade restrictions are
only rarely an efficient instrument for correcting "market failures" and
supplying "public goods"' (at 32). Precisely because of this faith,
trade-restricting market interventions to fulfil social or other human rights
obligations are likely to be viewed with great scepticism if one sees trade
liberalization rules as economic rights - the free trader can always imagine,
in the abstract, an alternative policy instrument to trade restrictions, which
is less trade restrictive and supposedly more efficient.
But in the real world, policy-makers have a limited and constrained tool
kit available to them to fulfil social and other human rights. Labelling may be
more efficient than a ban on a toxic substance with industrial uses. But what
if those handling the substance are mostly illiterate? Adjustment and training
and education subsidies to workers may be more efficient than trade
restrictions, but what if a country has had fiscal restraint imposed on it by
the IMF and the capital markets (as a condition for future access to those
markets)?
Petersmann's notion that the substantive obligations of the WTO law
(such as National Treatment) be understood as fundamental rights would make it
more difficult than at present for WTO members to defend their public
policies in terms of reasonable limits on those obligations. The key passage in
Petersmann's essay is the following: 'The universal recognition of human rights
requires us to construe the numerous public interest clauses in WTO law in
conformity with the human rights requirement that individual freedom and
non-discrimination may be restricted only to the extent necessary for
protecting other human rights' (at 645).
Here is a concrete suggestion about legal interpretation that allows us
to test the implications of Petersmann's general theory in the real world. The
existing exceptions in Article XX of the GATT, for example, which Petersmann
includes in the category of 'public interest' clauses, refer to a range of
public policy objectives, which may or may not be conceived in human rights
terms - including the protection of animal and human life and health (XX(b)),
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources (XX(g)), the effective
enforcement of domestic laws and regulations (XX(d)). On Petersmann's approach,
once a GATT obligation characterized as a fundamental right was found to be
violated, a WTO member could only invoke one of these exceptions, if it were to
make its argument in human rights terms. There are some in the human rights
community who might see this as a fine way of getting states to pay closer
attention to human rights law, especially to the content of economic, social
and cultural rights. However, there are significant risks here. One, that is
fairly obvious, is that institutionally within the WTO culture, there is
enormous scepticism about expansive understandings of human rights, and even
about economic, social and cultural rights generally.7 I myself have argued that international human
rights law is relevant to defining these exceptions, and I do think that in
specific cases it is possible that the Appellate Body of the WTO (which is
staffed not only by trade 'experts' but also distinguished public international
lawyers such as Georges Abi-Saab) would appreciate the relevance of human
rights to a WTO member's justification of its policies in terms of Article
XX.8 Nevertheless,
depending on human rights analysis to make the kind of case the US made in
Shrimp/Turtle about the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
seems questionable. The extent to which environmental concerns are
appropriately translated into the notion of 'environmental rights' is quite
controversial, and in the presence of this controversy, and given the
institutional context of the WTO, the Appellate Body might well be inclined to
take a cautious or conservative view.
Petersmann finesses this issue by suggesting that in the
Shrimp/Turtle case the Appellate Body of the WTO 'confirmed that import
restrictions may be justifiable under WTO law for protecting human rights
values' (at 645). But, in fact, in that decision, the Appellate Body did not
link the notion of conservation of exhaustible natural resources to human
rights values.9 Of course,
it might be possible to do so, interpreting the idea of sustainable development
in human rights terms, but the Appellate Body did not do so. Nor did it have to
refer to any norm of international human rights law in order to find that the
notion of exhaustible natural resources included living species.
Nor in the Shrimp/Turtle case did the Appellate Body apply the
necessity test that Petersmann recommends. The text of Article XX (g) requires
only that the measures in question be 'in relation to' the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources, and the Appellate Body found a rational
connection or nexus between the US measures and the goal of protecting
exhaustible natural resources.10 Moreover, in recent case law, the Appellate Body
has taken a flexible view of the level of scrutiny appropriate under those
exceptions in Article XX of the GATT where the word 'necessary' does appear.
Thus, in the recent Korea-Beef11 and EC-Asbestos12 cases, the Appellate Body has suggested that a
measure may be found to be 'necessary' even if it is not indispensable for
achieving a particular goal, provided that the measure is proportional to the
objective, and it has also held that where values such as human life are at
stake the margin of appreciation for domestic regulators should be particularly
wide. Petersmann's conception of 'necessity' - premised on the notion that what
is to be justified is the overriding of fundamental human rights to free trade
- would take us back to the kind of jurisprudence characteristic of the pre-WTO
era, where the hypothetical availability of a less-trade-restrictive
alternative in the ideal world of the economist would be enough for a member's
measure to fail the test of being 'necessary', for example, for the protection
of human health.13
Ironically, when Petersmann goes on in his essay to discuss democracy,
he himself points to a reason of principle why WTO dispute settlement tribunals
should show some deference to domestic regulations, which is valid even where
those regulations cannot be proven to be 'necessary' for the protection of
human rights. Thus, he observes: 'WTO bodies must exercise deference to
legitimate balancing decisions by national governments and parliaments which
enjoy more democratic legitimacy for the inevitable trade-offs than distant WTO
bodies focusing on trade rules' (at 646).
Yet, as we have just seen, when Petersmann himself moves to the concrete
level, and elaborates the implications for legal interpretation of the notion
that GATT obligations are fundamental human rights, this cashes out into less,
not more, deference to domestic democratic regulatory choices. It is hard not
to see some kind of tension or contradiction here.
Yet Petersmann is too sharp a thinker to simply leave it at that. One
reason why Petersmann's thought on these matters may be more consistent than it
first seems is the influence that the example of the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice has on his way of understanding the issues.
Petersmann sees the Court as understanding the freedoms (free movement of
goods, services, capital and people) in the Treaty of Rome as fundamental human
rights;14 and he also sees
the Court as sensitive to social justice and the democratic choices of member
states. He might argue that a human rights approach to WTO rules does suggest a
stricter legal test for limits to WTO obligations, but a stricter test
applied with a human rights sensibility would actually result in more
not less appropriate deference to domestic regulations.
Perhaps then we should support those aspects of Petersmann's project
that suggest the desirability of building a human rights sensibility within the
WTO. But what kind of human rights sensibility? Petersmann's reference
to the 'integration' of different bodies of human rights law, or different
rights, tends to obscure the fact that an emphasis on market freedoms as
fundamental human rights15
reflects one particular kind of rights sensibility. There is a set of
very basic political and normative struggles surrounding the entrenchment of
the free market outlook into human rights law that have not, contrary to
Petersmann, been exhausted by the Cold War. One only has to look at the
controversy surrounding the expropriation provisions of the NAFTA investment
Chapter, where individual investors have standing to sue governments, including
for some kinds of regulatory changes that fundamentally affect the value of
their property.16
Given these controversies, it would appear to be in Petersmann's favour
that he advocates greater democratic participation in the WTO as a corollary to
the building of a human rights sensibility into the Organization. His idea of
democracy, however, seems to focus on the creation of WTO advisory committees,
of parliamentarians and NGOs. But it is an open question whether such ideas
will ultimately not simply cabin or constrain democratic deliberation, through
formalizing an understanding of which stakeholders have a legitimate place at
the table; if democracy is about real power and real influence in shaping
outcomes, these proposals risk being placebos. Periodic meetings of such
committees are no substitute for an ongoing and inclusive process of engagement
of civil society and political actors with the activities of the WTO. In
fairness, Petersmann also favours greater domestic parliamentary control over
the making of WTO treaty rules. But whether this really cashes out into greater
democratic legitimacy depends on how well informed parliamentarians are, to
what extent they are independent rather than subject to the discipline of the
Party whip and therefore no real check on the executive, and also the extent to
which we believe that approval of today's government is enough to provide
legitimacy for rules that will have significant impact long after that
government is gone, and which it is costly for a future government to reverse
(as, in practical terms, it would either have to get the consent of all other
members to change the rules or accept a waiver, or be faced with the very
high-stakes choice of withdrawing from the WTO). Given the costs of
reversibility by a future government, my own view is that the people should be
consulted directly by referendum on the results of the Doha round, and that all
governments should undertake to translate the proposals into local languages,
and distribute them to the entire population, either electronically where
feasible and/or through pamphlets available at post offices or other contact
points. Governments should also provide access to national radio and television
to groups with different points of view, as part of an informed public debate
leading up to such a referendum.

1 See, generally, P. Magnette, L'Europe, l'Etat et la
democratie (2000).
2 These are: the rule of law, the limitation and
separation of government powers by checks and balances, democratic
self-government, human rights, social justice, and the notion that human rights
cannot be effectively protected without international law supplying
international 'public goods' and legal restraints on 'abuses of foreign policy
powers'.
3 See especially, the English version of Petersmann's
Habilitationschrift, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional
Problems of International Economic Law (1991), which is probably the first
sustained effort to provide a comprehensive legal theory of the trade regime.
For a critical engagement with Petersmann's theory of constitutional
pre-commitment as applied to the WTO, see Howse and Nicolaidis, 'Legitimacy and
Global Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO Is a Step Too Far', in R.
Porter, et al., (eds), Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The
Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium (2001).
4 This is not the only way of addressing the puzzle.
Influenced by the work of such scholars as Anne-Marie Slaughter, John Ruggie,
Robert Keohane on post-war multilateralism, I have provided an account of
bargained trade liberalization that stresses the role of multilateral rules in
constraining the externalization of the costs of domestic adjustment to
economic and social change and crisis, so as to prevent a protectionist
race-to-the-bottom. Howse, 'From Politics to Technocracy - and Back Again: The
Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime', 1 AJIL (2002) 94. As well,
more recent work in the economics literature has provided a complementary
explanation, based on 'terms of trade' externalities, K. Bagwell and R. W.
Staiger, GATT-THINK 16 National Bureau of Economic Research, Discussion Paper
No. 8005 (2000).
5 See A. Kojeve, Outline of a Phenomenology of
Right(transl. R. Howse and B.-P. Frost) (2000), Ch. III; see also, Steger,
'Afterward: 93The Trade and . . .94 Conundrum - A Commentary', 1 American
Journal of International Law (2002) 135.
6 Although, perhaps tellingly, the section of the article
entitled 'The Need for WTO Competition and Social Rules as Necessary
Complements to Human Rights' deals only with competition rules and never
actually discusses social rules.
7 At the World Trade Forum in Berne last August, where
many of the leading traditional WTO experts gathered to address the question of
WTO law and human rights, several of the most eminent of them even questioned
whether any human rights were sufficiently well understood or clearly embodied
in international law so as to be relevant to the operation of the WTO!
8 R. Howse and M. Matua, Protecting Human Rights in a
Global Economy: Challenges for the World Trade Organization
(2000).
9 US-Import Prohibition of Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998),
paras 129-131. For an analysis of this ruling and the Appellate Body's
subsequent ruling on US implementation, see Howse, 'The Appellate Body Rulings
in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and
Environment Debate', 27 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law (2002)
489. See also for analysis of the first AB ruling, Mavroidis, "Trade and
Environment after the Shrimp-Turtle Litigation', 34 Journal of World
Trade (2000)73 and Chang,'Toward A Greener GATT: Enviornmental Trade
Measures and the Shrimp/Turtle Case', 74 Southern California Law Review
(2000) 31.
10 US-Shrimp Report, supra note 9, at
para. 141: 'The means are, in principle, reasonably related to the ends'
(emphasis added). In the earlier Gasoline case, the AB noted that is
unreasonable to infer a necessity test as a general requirement of the 'public
interest' clauses in GATT Article XX. The Appellate Body held: 'in enumerating
the various categories of governmental acts, laws or regulations which WTO
Members may carry out or promulgate in pursuit of differing legitimate state
policies or interests outside the realm of trade liberalization,
Article XX uses different terms in respect of different categories:
"necessary" - in paragraphs (a), (b) and (d); "essential" - in paragraph (j);
"relating to" - in paragraphs (c), (e) and (g); "for the protection of" - in
paragraph (f); "in pursuance of" - in paragraph (h); and "involving" - in
paragraph (i). It does not seem reasonable to suppose that the WTO Members
intended to require, in respect of each and every category, the same kind or
degree of connection or relationship between the measure under appraisal and
the state interest or policy sought to be promoted or realized.' United
States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the
Appellate Body. WT/DS52, 20 May 1996, at 12.
11 Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS161, 169AB/R, 11
December 2000, at paras 161-164.
12 European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS135/AB/R, 12 March 2001. For a detailed analysis of these aspects of the
Korea-Beef and EC-Asbestos cases, see Howse and Tuerk, 'The WTO
Impact on Internal Regulations: A Case Study of the Canada-EC Asbestos
Dispute', in G. de BFArca and J. Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO: Legal and
Constitutional Issues (2001), pp. 324-327.
13 Here the most illustrative example is the Thai
Cigarette case. In that case, Thailand was unable to justify a ban on
imported cigarettes on the basis that the imports came with sophisticated
Western marketing techniques that were persuading large numbers of young people
to take up smoking, thereby triggering a future health crisis. The panel ruled
that there was the less restrictive alternative of legal regulation of
advertising, marketing methods, and so forth; however, the panel ignored
evidence before it from the World Health Organization suggesting that in a
number of cases developing countries had discovered that, given their legal and
monetary resources, tobacco multinationals were able to find their way around
such restrictions, once their products were on the market in the country
concerned. Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes, BISD 37 S/200-228 (1990).
14 As a matter of positive law, there is a serious
question as to whether the ECJ ever viewed what it was doing in those terms;
but that is a matter for European law experts to debate, and I am not one of
them.
15 In one footnote he even apparently approvingly cites
Richard Pipes for the proposition that the right to property is the most
fundamental human right.
16 For an attempt by a NAFTA Ch. 11 investor-state
arbitral panel to define the limits of the concept of 'expropriation' in Ch. 11
as applied to regulatory actions of the host state, see Pope & Talbot
Inc. and Government of Canada, Interim Award by the Arbitral Tribunal, 26
June 2000, at paras 88 et seq.
  
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