
Cooperating for Peace and Security presents a comprehensive collection of essays on multilateral security cooperation since 1989. Leading experts on wide-ranging topics within the ambit of international security and international cooperation analyse the complex relationship between multilateralism and United States security interests.

After the end of the Cold War, scholars from various disciplines envisaged the United States, as the sole single-power of the international system, shaping international security arrangements in accordance with its security interests and policy considerations. The atrocious terrorist attacks of 9/11 put terrorism on the priorities of the US security agenda; as a consequence, the US started a 'war on terror', which effectively engaged not only the US and its allies, but also the United Nations. Up to 2003, when the US clashed with the UN, the US played a significant role in the evolution (and innovation) of international security institutions within and outside the UN.

Ten years after the 9/11 attacks and in the aftermath of the failure of the UN reform initiative in 2005, the US has taken diverse paths in the realms of international peace and security, foreign policy, and diplomacy. Following the challenging strategies that were enunciated by the Bush administration in 2002 and 2006, the Obama administration issued the new Security Strategy Doctrine in May 2010.

The first Bush doctrine, in 2002, was promulgated in time in order to clarify the intentions of the US in view of the ‘then’ contemporary threats, namely terrorists or non-state actors, rogue states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Even though the US response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks was encouraging for those who expressed their concerns about the single superpower’s tendency towards unilateralism, international law scholars reflected extensively on visions concerning the emergence (or even the existence) of international hegemonic law whereby international law was ‘doomed’ or ‘destined’ to be shaped by meeting the perceived security needs and interests of a hegemon, a single superpower.

At the time, the fact that the US deliberately approached and effectively engaged a number of international organizations and assembled a coalition of supporting states before engaging in military action in Afghanistan was perceived as an attempt on the part of the US to keep
military action within the contours of international law and at the same time to gain some practical advantages, i.e., by engaging an international organization, the UN in the case of the military operation in Afghanistan, the US managed to magnify the legitimacy of the military action and the US authority by a judicious combination of voting power and leadership.

The 2002 Bush doctrine contained an explicit claim for the interpretation of customary international law in favour of pre-emptive self-defence, thus setting aside a black-letter interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter; this claim essentially requested the adaptation of the post-1945 collective security system and the laws regulating the use of force to a strategic concept. The claim was based on the re-conceptualization of two longstanding criteria in *jus ad bellum*: ‘imminence’ and ‘necessity’. According to the 2002 Bush doctrine, the criteria of ‘imminence’ and ‘necessity’, which emerged originally from the correspondence between the US and the United Kingdom in the Caroline incident of 1837, should be interpreted by taking into account the asymmetrical dimensions of threats, the unwillingness or inability of a state to eliminate the danger of use of weapons of mass destruction emerging from its territory, and the temporal dimension of a military action to respond to the maturation of a threat before it materializes into an armed attack. While the 2002 Bush doctrine pinpointed correctly issues which concern the exercise of the right of self-defence with effective results (i.e., the protection of the state under attack), when it is read in view of the military operation in Iraq in 2003, it is rather perceived as a dubious attempt to bring strategic principles and interests into accord with the existing rules on use of force which seeks to promote an extension of the unilateral authority to use force. The tenuous relationship between the US and the UN in the case of Iraq in 2003 caused a transatlantic debate over the role and the relevance of the UN as the cornerstone of the contemporary collective security system. Albeit the 2006 Bush doctrine was a milder version of the 2002 Bush doctrine, it nonetheless reiterated the same principles and goals that were set in its predecessor document and reasserted a policy of maintaining US military dominance. Even though the Iraq case in 2003 revealed how deeply the US and the UN policies were at odds, and despite the US claims for unilateral action where the Security Council found itself in stalemate, in the years that followed it was observed that the US, for all of its unrivalled power, contributed only in certain areas decisively with regard to the evolution of the multilateral security architecture.

In a formal break with the ‘go-it-alone’ Bush era, the 2010 National Security Strategy differs significantly from the security doctrines of the previous administration. The central concern voiced in the 2010 National Security Strategy is the US’s standing in the world. Although the document stipulates that the US will act (unilaterally) when it is deemed necessary, the Obama doctrine puts emphasis on the need for expanding partnerships beyond traditional US allies to encompass rising powers in order to share the international burden. The document calls for diplomatic engagement and economic discipline with little reference to *jus ad bellum* issues or to the prospect of cooperation between the US and international institutions.

The pressing reality of contemporary international affairs shifted the focus of the contemporary US security agenda to the mass atrocities that were committed by Colonel Gaddafi in Libya in 2011 and tested the Obama doctrine in practice. The US along with the UN, after a meticulous study of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Libya, resorted to a prompt action. One of the finest moments of political culture and diplomacy post 9/11 capitalized in the form of multilateral cooperation between the members of the Security Council which resulted in the adoption of Security Council Resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011). The 2011 operation in Libya presents a case in which the US acted out of necessity (as the Obama doctrine promulgates), but nevertheless resorted to the UN for legitimization of its acts. It is interesting to note that as the Libyan crisis did not fall within the priorities of the US security agenda, and the US reaction to the Libyan crisis was more or less hesitant, the UN reacted on time and effectively. For example, the Human Rights Council, one of the UN organs, was the first to decide on the suspension of Libya’s membership as a sanction for Gaddafi’s violent suppression of civil
unrest in Libya. Nonetheless, the 2011 operation in Libya serves as an example whereby the US foreign policy remained the pivot around which the collective security system functioned, as the international community was waiting patiently for the US to decide whether to resort to military action.

*Cooperating for peace and security* captures unique moments, from the end of the Cold War to 2009, with regard to the relationship between US security interests and the factors that contributed to the evolution of multilateral security arrangements in the light of three processes that dominated the post-Cold War era. These processes were driven: (1) by the US determination to adapt Cold War instruments to the challenge of including Russia into the Western order; or (2) by the US tolerance to deal with ‘soft’ security threats through security arrangements, institutions, and mechanisms which were established to deal with issues pertaining to internal conflict, humanitarian crises, peace-keeping and peace-building operations, and new arrangements for peace negotiation; or (3) by a structure of institutions set at regional level that aimed in containing or restraining the US.

This book benefits from detailed and most informative contributions by excellent scholars in the field of international peace and security. Given the diverse academic backgrounds of the contributors, the book presents a multi-angled analysis of multi-faceted issues resulting in a collection of essays on various aspects of international cooperation: case studies on Cold War institutions (i.e., Security Council; European Security Cooperation; NATO; nuclear non-proliferations institutions; biological and chemical weapons) and new international peace and security tools and mechanisms (i.e., peacekeeping; post conflict reconstruction aid; peacebuilding; regional and sub-regional African mechanisms; international courts and tribunals); and a set of policy recommendations. Several of the contributors are researchers and project coordinators at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, while other contributors are legal scholars.

It is important that the book includes multi-angled contributions which are based on empirical evidence, policy analysis, or legal analysis. Each one of the contributors offers a critical assessment and a scholarly presentation of the issues at stake, which appear to be more relevant than ever, given the recent developments in the African region in 2011.

Bruce Jones and Shepard Forman set the theoretical contours within which two worlds of international security function in the post-Cold War period; the first world of international security is dominated by the US-driven process of adapting Cold War instruments to the post-Cold War era, while the second world of international security is a US-tolerated, but not US-dominated, world which features normative and institutional entrepreneurs in the form of new institutions and new actors.

Stewart Patrick offers a candid presentation of the Clinton and Bush policies and assesses the prospects of multilateral cooperation after 9/11 (Chapter 2).

Stephen John Stedman reflects on various issues concerning the UN transformation in an era where soft balancing affects the conduct of international affairs (Chapter 3). Stedman makes a reference to the goals that were set by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan between 2003 and 2006, and acknowledges the fact that from 2004 onwards the US eventually became more actively engaged in UN affairs as long as the UN proved to play a useful role in furthering US foreign policy goals.

David Malone documents the Security Council practice in the post-Cold War era, and remarks that despite the political interests of the permanent members of the Security Council the Security Council appeared to be far more energetic and active than at the time of the Cold War (Chapter 4).

Richard Gowan and Sara Batlanglich pinpoint the changes that have occurred in the European Security Cooperation scheme since the end of the Cold War (Chapter 5). European politics and European institutional influence seem to be solely reactive to or conditioned on the threat of US unilateral military operations. However, Europe has gone through a significant transformation and now shows itself to be a growing security actor.
Mats Berdal and David Ucko authoritatively present the evolution of NATO as a military alliance (Chapter 6). NATO’s operations have expanded significantly in the post-Cold War era. This is due to the fact that European countries have developed new defence capabilities and that NATO appears now to support other actors in the field of international peace and security. However, because NATO lacks widespread international legitimacy of the kind that is exerted by the UN, it is expected that in the post-Cold War era NATO will still be treated with certain suspicion by many states; this may involve political costs at the expense of the powerful and assertive image of military organization that NATO purports to project to the international community. This point was highlighted in spring 2011 when NATO delayed significantly (due to Turkey’s opposition) reaching a decision over its involvement in the operation in Libya.

Christine Wing examines the US-led evolution of nuclear non-proliferation institutions (Chapter 7). The analysis is conducted by taking into consideration the growing fear among states that terrorists could possess nuclear weapons and the inability to assess the actual state-level proliferation.

Eric Rosand and Sebastian von Einsiedel present the evolution of multilateral institutions in the light of the war on terror (Chapter 8). The UN organs managed to adapt to the new security challenges by acting promptly and establishing new institutions (i.e., the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the WMD Committee) as monitoring mechanisms for the implementation of states’ obligations as they arise from the relevant Security Council Resolutions.

Fiona Simpson examines the evolution in the framework of biological and chemical weapons and stresses the US dominance in the field (Chapter 9).

Ian Johnstone presents the normative evolution at the UN in terms of operational activities (Chapter 10). The analysis focuses on the controversial doctrine of humanitarian intervention and its latter form known as the Responsibility to Protect, and other norms which constituted the normative framework within which UN operations took place. These norms may have been given content by the UN Secretary General and the UN Secretariat; however, they were largely promoted by the US. The humanitarian situation in Libya was addressed by the UN within the normative contours of humanitarian intervention, as Resolution 1973 was carefully drafted to highlight the need to protect civilians and civilian-situated areas.

Barnet Rubin analyses issues pertaining to sovereignty and security with emphasis on peace-building and state-building (Chapter 11).

Teresa Whitfield’s work on new arrangements for peace negotiation sheds light upon uncharted territories of international peace and security (Chapter 12). The emergence of these new arrangements, i.e., Contact Groups, or more informal structures, contributes largely to conflict management while their effectiveness remains undisputed.

Abby Stoddard makes the case for aiding war victims in the contemporary strategic environment (Chapter 13). Interestingly, Stoddard notes that even though the US was one of the largest contributors in the field, it abstained from an active role in shaping the institutional humanitarian structure or the policy domain. This fact served the interests of the middle powers for the development of an impartial humanitarian institutional structure where the US would not be treated as a superpower with privileges attached.

Sarjoh Bah analyses the evolution of regional and sub-regional collective security mechanisms in Post-Cold War Africa (Chapter 14). The African collective security mechanisms, which developed on the margins of international politics and did not constitute part of the primary US strategic interests, served the security needs of the region only to a certain point. However, in recent regional security crises, especially during 2011, the African collective security mechanisms proved to be almost ineffective. To prove the point, in the case of Libya, the Security Council in the operative paragraphs of Resolution 1973 requested repeatedly the cooperation of the Organization of Islamic Conference rather than that of the African Union. Also, the imposition of the no-fly zone in Libya was organized first by the great powers of the international community.
(US, UK, France), and then by NATO, rather than the African Union. The African Union had a rather limited role as a mediator with poor results; its diplomatic efforts (which were backed by the European Union) failed to bring a peaceful end to the conflict in Libya. Thus, the role of the African Union in future regional crises is likely to be ambivalent.

Cesare Romano comments on the remarkable multiplication of international courts and tribunals that materialized following the end of the Cold War (Chapter 15). The emergence of human rights courts and international criminal tribunals and their respective jurisprudence have strengthened international justice and have developed international law to a great extent.

Richard Gowan and Bruce Jones reflect on the adaptation and evolution of international institutions in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 world (Chapter 16). While international security institutions have developed significantly and new collective security institutions and arrangements have emerged, especially as products of regional security structures, ‘the fundamentals of the Cold War order remain the same’ (Gowan and Jones, at 316).

Cooperating for Peace and Security brings together many scholars from various fields who were involved in the efforts to reform the UN in 2005. They recognize that the US power has not always been a driving force for institutional adaptation; in many cases, the US power acted as a restraint on change. However, even this kind of restraint is a constituent element of institutional evolution. The contemporary international security environment is characterized by the emergence of multiple regional security threats. However, regional security schemes, which developed due to a lack of trust in the Security Council and its legitimacy, seem to be working only in limited situations. European, African, and Asian regionalism, as a counter-weight to US policy, cannot be fully understood without recognizing that the current international security system lacks a coherent strategic direction. The book authoritatively argues that international institutions do not necessarily evolve by adapting to the will of a hegemonic power. However, the effectiveness of the international security system depends largely on the condition that the US and the other powers of the international system agree on the role and the content of the existing international security institutions. Future crises, especially at regional level, are likely to give more substance to this point and confirm the observations that are brought forward by the authors of this book.

In conclusion, it is perhaps most important to acknowledge the fact that the contributors have dedicated the book to the late Thomas Franck, an exceptional scholar of international law and international institutions, and a captivating and gifted teacher for all of us, his students.

Individual Contributions

Stewart Patrick, ‘The Mission Determines the Coalition’: the United States and Multilateral Cooperation after 9/11;
Stephen John Stedman, UN Transformation in an Era of Soft Balancing;
David Malone, An Evolving UN Security Council;
Richard Gowan and Sara Batmanglich, Too Many Institutions? European Security Cooperation after the Cold War;
Mats Berdal and David Ucko, Whither NATO?;
Christine Wing, The Evolution of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Institutions;
Eric Rosand and Sebastian von Einsiedel, 9/11, the ‘War on Terror’ and the Evolution of Counter-Terrorism Institutions;
Fiona Simpson, Evolution and Innovation. Biological and Chemical Weapons;
Ian Johnstone, Normative Evolution at the UN. Impact on Operational Activities;
Barnett R. Rubin, Constructing Sovereignty for Security;
Teresa Whitfield, New Arrangements for Peace Negotiation;  
Abby Stoddard, International Humanitarian Cooperation. Aiding War’s Victims in a Shifting Strategic Environment;  
Sarjoh Bah, The Evolution of Regional and Sub-Regional Collective Security Mechanisms in Post-Cold War Africa;  
Cesare Romano, International Courts and Tribunals;  
Richard Gowan and Bruce Jones, Conclusion: International Institutions and the Problems of Adaptation

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