Articles

• Scott, Joanne

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between ‘negative’ (market) and ‘positive’ (policy) integration in the European Union and the World Trade Organization. It does so in relation to trade in goods, and takes as its example the area of environmental law. It argues that the strong role accorded to instruments of policy coordination in the EU (through the adoption of European standards and harmonizing legislation) is tied to the fact that such measures are contestable, so that authority and contestability go hand in hand. Contestation proceeds by way of administrative and judicial channels, and serves to instil a measure of accountability and to protect diversity. In the WTO, by contrast, the Appellate Body has shown a marked reluctance to accord authority to international standards and — important developments in Shrimp/Turtle notwithstanding — deep uncertainty persists as to the relationship between the free movement norms and multilateral environmental agreements. This paper argues that in defining the role of these instruments, the Appellate Body would do well to regard their authority as contingent. In the WTO — as in the EU — contestability could contribute to ensuring forms of transnational governance which are more accountable and appropriately respectful of diversity. To the extent that contestability would seem to imply a quasi-review function for the Appellate Body, some might fear that this suggestion would feed the ‘constitutionalization’ of the WTO, by placing it in a position of supremacy vis-à-vis other regimes. This paper argues that this fear would be misplaced.