Articles

• Orakhelashvili, Alexander

Abstract

The European Convention on Human Rights was adopted as an instrument to protect the rights and interests of individual human beings rather than of state parties. It thus embodies obligations which objectively protect human beings and are not reducible to mutual or reciprocal legal commitments of states. The jurisprudence of the Convention organs has recognized the importance of the nature of the Convention obligations, and has interpreted and applied a number of its substantive and procedural provisions accordingly. This has become possible through the use of appropriate methods of treaty interpretation, dictated by the character of the Convention obligations. In particular, the Convention organs refused to interpret the Convention restrictively, as this would endanger its integral application which is inherent to the Convention's object and purpose. However, the recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights indicates some trends which undermine the rationale of the Convention through the use of interpretive methods that are of doubtful value in cases in which they are applied. This article examines the Court's recent jurisprudence, and concludes that adherence to such interpretation approaches endangers the very rationale of the European Convention and its ability to effectively benefit those it has been designed to protect.