Symposium

• Damrosch, Lori F.

Abstract

The five permanent members of the Security Council form the core of an enforcement system against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The sanctions regime against Iraq shows commonality of interest among the five declared nuclear‐weapons states to block the spread of WMD. This article first establishes the normative framework under which restraint of WMD is not simply a policy preference but a legal obligation rooted in widely‐ratified treaties and general international law. After surveying multilateral non‐proliferation regimes, the paper turns to the aspects of US law relevant to the imposition of non‐proliferation sanctions, not just against Iraq but also against other violators. The Iraq sanctions are then compared to other proliferation cases (Libya; North Korea; India/Pakistan) where unilateral (US) or concerted multilateral sanctions have been an available enforcement tool in the decade of the Iraq sanctions. Sanctions practice concerning actual or potential proliferators suggests an incipient pattern of potential Security Council enforcement. The Iraq case is unique because of Iraq's violations from within the relevant legal regimes, and precedential because of the Security Council's response in signalling to potential violators that serious sanctions can follow the breach of non‐proliferation obligations. Arguably, non‐proliferation regimes are stronger and more credible because the Council stayed the course on Iraq.