Articles

• Johnstone, Ian

Abstract

The UN embodies a precarious ‘institutional bargain’ between the United States and the rest of the world, based in part on a distinctly American vision of world order. The US was largely responsible for creating the normative and institutional order embodied in the UN, and for reshaping it in the post-Cold war era. This article argues that the US military action against Iraq has done serious but not irrevocable damage to that order. The UN has been a surprisingly conducive venue for cultivating a climate among Member States that renders them receptive to — or hard-pressed to resist — the US’ projection of soft power. That climate affects and has been affected by innovative approaches to peace and security over the last 14 years, which the US supported and often led. The immediate response to 9/11 reinforced the tradition of the US using the UN to shape global norms. Most states were prepared to acquiesce, evidenced by the widespread support for self-defensive action in Afghanistan and Security Council Resolution 1373 on terrorism. Most were not prepared to acquiesce to the invasion of Iraq, however, because the context in which the action took place and the discourse surrounding it were seen as a major departure from the prevailing normative and institutional framework. They were seen not as an attempt to adapt existing norms and institutions to new threats, but rather to tear them down and start again from scratch. The result is a damaged UN Charter-based legal order, but one that is likely to recover, not least because American interests and identity are embedded in it.